The Ethical and Political Philosophy of Pierre Gassendi

The Ethical and Political Philosophy of Pierre Gassendi
Lisa T. Sarasohn
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 20, Number 3, July 1982, pp.
239-260 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1982.0033
For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227114/summary
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The Ethical and
Political Philosophy of
Pierre Gassendi
L. T. S A R A S O H N
THE EnRLV seventeenth-century French philosopher and cleric Pierre Gassendi has been largely forgotten in modern times, except perhaps as a footnote to Descartes's M e d i t a t i o n e s . 1 Yet, in his own time Gassendi was regarded
as the intellectual peer of Descartes, and he represented a fundamental
difference in philosophic orientation. While Descartes tried to rescue philosophic certainty from the perils of the skeptical revival, Gassendi rejected
rationalism in favor of empircism. ~ Starting from an empirical epistemology,
Gassendi constructed a scientific philosophy which integrated the new mechanical science with Epicurean atomism? While Descartes largely confined
himself to harmonizing his rationalism with theological imperatives, Gassendi explored the ramifications of his reinvigorated and Christianized Epicureanism for ethical and political issues as well.
Modern scholars have consistently undervalued Gassendi's ethical theory,
' In the spring of 1641, Descartes asked Father Mersenne to circulate the Meditationes (not
yet published) among the philosophically able of his friends in order to elicit comments and
objections. Mersenne, Hobbes, and Gassendi all wrote objections, which, with some others, were
published at the end of the 164] edition of the Meditationes. Gassendi republished his "Objectiones Quintae" and further debate with Descartes in the a644 Disquisitio Metaphysica. For a full
account of this incident, see G. Sortais, La Philosophie Moderne depuis Baconjusqu'a Leibniz, 2 vols.
(Paris, 192o), 2:11-15.
R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism (New York, 1964), p. 145. Discussions of Gassendi's
"modified skepticism" can also be found in the following works: H. Berr, Du Scepticisme de
Gassendi (Paris, 1898); J. S. Spink, French Free-thought from Gassendi to Voltaire (New York, 196o ),
pp. 84ff.; O.R. Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi (The Hague, 1971), pp. I ao-47.
3 Gassendi's atomic theories are elaborated in the "Physica" of his Syntagma Philosophicam,
published in the Opera Omnia, 6 vols. (Lyon, 1658), vols. I and 2. For the most recent treatment
of Gassendi's scientific thought, see Bloch, Philosophie de Gassendi, where he argues that Gassendi
was part of the nominalist tradition.
[239]
240
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
d i s m i s s i n g it as u n o r i g i n a l a n d u n i m p o r t a n t . 4 B u t close e x a m i n a t i o n s h o w s
t h a t G a s s e n d i u s e d his c o m p r e h e n s i v e k n o w l e d g e o f E p i c u r e a n ethics to
d e v e l o p his o w n p r o f o u n d e t h i c a l a n d political system. T h i s s y s t e m is
e l a b o r a t e d in B o o k 3, a p p r o p r i a t e l y e n t i t l e d " E t h i c a , " o f his Syntagma
Philosophicam. 5
G a s s e n d i ' s first t a s k in his t r a n s m u t a t i o n o f E p i c u r e a n i s m was to r i d t h e
a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e a t h e i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t h a d b e e n a s s o c i a t e d with
it since its i n c e p t i o n . T h e C h u r c h F a t h e r s h a d v e h e m e n t l y a t t a c k e d E p i c u r u s ' s d e n i a l o f d i v i n e p r o v i d e n c e a n d t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e soul. 6 T h e e n t i r e
E p i c u r e a n m o r a l s y s t e m was m u c h less a m e n a b l e to C h r i s t i a n r e h a b i l i t a t i o n
t h a n was its physics. W h e r e a s o n e c o u l d s i m p l y i n t r o d u c e G o d as t h e c r e a t o r
and maintainer of the atoms, thus establishing creation and providence, 7
E p i c u r e a n utility a n d t h e p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e c o u l d n o t so easily b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o C h r i s t i a n c h a r i t y a n d self-sacrifice. 8
E p i c u r u s h a d a r g u e d t h a t all o u r a c t i o n s a r e b a s e d o n a c a l c u l a t i o n o f
w h a t w o u l d m o s t m a x i m i z e o u r p l e a s u r e a n d m i n i m i z e o u r p a i n ; this c a l c u l a tion is e n t i r e l y d e v o i d o f a n y o t h e r m o r a l c o n t e n t e x c e p t i n d i v i d u a l selfi n t e r e s t . S e l f - i n t e r e s t w o u l d e n c o u r a g e self-sufficiency, since it is b e t t e r to
"live a p a r t " (lathe biosis) f r o m t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s a n d d a n g e r s o f social life. ~
T h e p o l i t i c a l passivity e n c o u r a g e d b y t h e E p i c u r e a n a n t i s o c i a l m o r a l i t y
4 Bloch condemns Gassendi's ethical writings as full of "la platitude et l'inconsistance" (pp.
376-77). Rochot believes Gassendi was "tr~s conformiste" ("Gassendi: Le Philosophe," in Pierre
Gassendi: Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre [Paris, x955], p. 99).
The "Ethics" was written some time between 1634 and 1645. Its date of composition is
interesting, because various themes in Gassendi's work reflect an ongoing debate with Descartes
and Hobbes. For a more complete discussion of Gassendi's relationship with these philosophers,
see chaps. 6 and 7 of my dissertation, The Influence o[ Epicurean Philosophy on Seventeenth Century
Ethical and Political Thought: The Moral Philosophy of Pierre Ga.~sendi (University of California, Los
Angeles, x979).
6 The third-century Christian Apologists Arnobius and Lactantius were particularly concerned with refuting Epicurus. By the fourth century, however, Epicureanism had ceased to be
a vital force in the western world. Augustine proclaimed, "the ashes of much more recent and
more vocal Stoics and Epicureans are not warm enough to strike out a spark against the
Christian faith" (Letters [New York, 19531, p. 273 ). Epicureanism lingered in the Middle Ages
almost entirely only as a synonym for debauchery until the Italian humanist Poggio rediscovered Lucretius's De Rerum Natura in 1417. The tenth book of Diogenes Eaertius was printed
for the first time in 1533. Very little scholarly work has been done on Epicureanism in the
middle ages, but see K. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittalter bis Newton, vol. 1 (Darmstadt, 1963), for the history of atomism in this period.
7 Gassendi does this rather neatly in the "Physica," Opera Omnia, 1:274-84.
Epicurus's ethical teachings can be found in three extant public letters and in the "Principal Sayings," included in Diogenes Laertius's biographical sketch of the philosopher, in Lives of
Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1925), bk. lO. For an account of the
ethical philosophy of Epicurus, see C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 19~6), pp.
515ff.
Epicurus, The Extant Remains, trans. C. Bailey (Oxford, 19e6), pp. 95-97-
PIERRE GASSENDI
241
jarred significantly with both the humanist ideal of civic duty and the rapidly
prevailing Machiavellianism of the seventeenth century. 1~ With these difficulties in mind, and with an acute knowledge of political realities, Gassendi
began his rehabilitation of Epicureanism.
The first part of the "Ethics" is called "de Felicitate." Gassendi knew he
could never safely incorporate Epicurean atomism into his own philosophy if
the Epicurean concept of pleasure as the highest good and the end of life
was not properly understood?' Thus, time and again he emphasizes, "Epicurus feels that no other pleasure is the end, than that [pleasure] which consists in stability, somewhat like repose, namely tranquility and freedom from
pain. '''~ Reiterating the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius, and adding
some logical arguments of his own, Gassendi shows that Epicurean pleasure
is imbued with morality and leads to an ascetic way of life. He then assimilates Epicurus's combination of pleasure and virtue into his own interpretation of the system: "I add to this only, that since p l e a s u r e . . , should be
understood as that thing which is real and genuine, and in which the principle of the highest good and happiness itself consists; therefore, virture alone
is called inseparable from pleasure, because only it may be real and genuine,
thus it is the necessary cause of pleasure, that is, when virtue has been
posited, pleasure and felicity follow. ''':~ In other words, a man cannot be
happy, or be in the most pleasurable state possible for man, without being
virtuous, because virtue is the only sure way to secure tranquillity of the
mind and lack of pain in the body.
To both Gassendi and Epicurus right reason (ratio sana) is the means to
pleasure and virtue. It will defend us from stress due to engendered or
'" For the humanist ideal o f civic duty, see E. F. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom
(Harvard, 1958 ).
,1 It seems that as early as his first philosophic work, the Exercitationes Paradoxicae (1624) I
an attack on Aristotle--Gassendi was an ethical Epicurean. In the preface, he writes a description o f his p r o p o s e d work: "Finally, Book VII deals with moral philosophy. It hardly requires a
lengthy recapitulation. In one word, it teaches Epicurus' doctrine o f pleasure by showing in
what way the greatest good consists o f pleasure and how the reward of h u m a n deed and virtues
is based u p o n this principle" (The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi, ed. and trans. C. B. Brush
[New York, 1972], p. 25). In the De Vita et Moribus Epicuri, written in 1633-34 but published
only in 1647 (Lyon), Gassendi also emphasized the Epicurean concept o f pleasure and its
connection with the virtues, as well as indicating that Epicurus had a more p r o f o u n d understanding o f man's capacities than the Stoics had.
. . . . Ethica," Opera Omnia, 2:682: "Epicurus non Miam voluptatem esse finem censuerit,
quam earn, quae consistit in stabilitate, & quasi quiete, Indolentiam puta & Tranquillitatem."
This and all other translations from the "Ethics" are mine.
,3 Ibid., p. 693. " A d d o heic solum, cure V o l u p t a s . . . ea intelligatur, quae vera, g e r m a n a q u e
sit, & in qua ratio summi boni, foelicitasque ipsa consistat; ideo Virtutem solam dici ab ea
inseparablem, quod ea sit sola, vt vera, ac germana, sic necessaria illius causa, hoc est, qua posita
voluptas, felicitasque consequatur."
242
HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY
social p r e j u d i c e s (ingenerantia opiniones) a n d serve as a m e a n s to calculate
w h a t will b r i n g us the g r e a t e s t a m o u n t o f h a p p i n e s s a n d the least a m o u n t o f
pain. G a s s e n d i a r g u e d that r e a s o n teaches us, f o r e x a m p l e , that t h e r e is
n o t h i n g evil to be f e a r e d f r o m G o d o r f r o m death, since sensual p e r c e p t i o n
ceases after d e a t h a n d we c a n n o t feel pain. I n addition, we s h o u l d r e n d e r an
i n d i f f e r e n t soul t o w a r d the f u t u r e a n d live f o r today, since h a p p i n e s s is
j u d g e d n o t by q u a n t i t y b u t by quality. A l t h o u g h m a n c a n n o t achieve c o m plete h a p p i n e s s , d u e to his lack o f c o m p l e t e wisdom, the wise m a n can
m a x i m i z e his p l e a s u r e a n d m i n i m i z e his pain by following reason, which
teaches us to desire o n l y w h a t is n a t u r a l a n d necessary. ~4 All o f these tenets,
e x c e p t f o r s o m e m i n o r bows to Christianity, a r e familiar f r o m the original
Epicurean doctrine.
G a s s e n d i is especially fascinated with the use o f r e a s o n in the calculus o f
pleasure a n d pain. I n his analysis, he e q u a t e s it with the virtue o f p r u d e n c e ,
the " p r i n c e o f morality." H e writes: "Certainly it is p r u d e n c e that prescribes
w h a t o u g h t to be d o n e , so that we p u r s u e the e n d s o f virtue as g o o d things,
a n d we t u r n away f r o m the o p p o s i t e s o f these e n d s as evil things: but, by
these definitions, m e a n s s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d particularly, which are called
g o o d i n s o f a r as t h e y are useful a n d c o n d u c i v e to ends; they are called bad
i n s o f a r as they are h a r m f u l a n d t u r n o n e away f r o m ends. '''5
So, w h e t h e r we call this calculating ability r i g h t r e a s o n o r p r u d e n c e , it is
the ability to realize that s o m e t h i n g will b r i n g p l e a s u r e o r pain in the l o n g
r u n a n d to suit o u r actions to this k n o w l e d g e . T h u s , w h e n we are d e t e r m i n ing a c o u r s e o f action, we s h o u l d m a k e sure that no law, c u s t o m , o r h o n o r
prohibits it, that no ill health o r d a m a g e to o u r r e p u t a t i o n s will follow f r o m
it, a n d t h a t it will b r i n g n o n e e d , pain, o r p e n a l t y e i t h e r now o r in the f u t u r e .
T h r o u g h these criteria, virtue b e c o m e s the r o a d to h a p p i n e s s ? 6
H a v i n g a r g u e d that p l e a s u r e is the highest g o o d a n d pain the greatest
'~ Ibid., pp. 664ff., 694.
~5 Ibid., pp. 735, 744: "nimirum Prudentiae sit, ita agendum praescribere, ut fineis virtuturn, tanquam bonos assequamur; opposita finium, tanquam mala declinemus: Verum debent
his vocibis intelligi praesertim Media, quae eatenus bona dicantur, quatenus utila, conducentiaque ad fineis sunt; eatenus mala, quatenus noxia, & a finibus avertentia." "Right Reason," or
prudence, became a very important topos in the sixteenth century, and it was used in arguments
in favor of the active versus the contemplative life. Robert Hoopes, in Right Reason in the English
Renaissance (Cambridge, 1962), defines it in the following way: "It is a kind of rational and
philosophic conscience which distinguishes man from the beasts and which links man with man
and God. This taculty was implanted by God in all men, Christian and heathen alike, as a guide
to truth and conduct." We shall see that Gassendi used this concept in precisely this way. Bloch
("Gassendi and the Transition from the Middle Ages to the Classical Era," Yale French Studies 49
[ 1973]:52n.) remarks that Gassendi was certainly influenced in his doctrine of prudence by Jean
Bodin_
~r "'Ethica," Opera Omnia, ~:694.
PIERRE GASSENDI
243
evil, Gassendi reinforces his argument from observation, emphasizing the
Epicurean argument that the first thing a newborn seeks is pleasure, and the
first thing it flees from is pain. He then introduces what will be one of the
most crucial elements of his own ethical system. According to Gassendi, God
uses pleasure and pain as the providential devices for carrying out his eternal designs without having to interfere miraculously in the natural process:
R a t h e r it is s u i t a b l e t h a t we r e g a r d with w o n d e r t h a t c u n n i n g o f t h e m o s t wise
A r t i f i c e r o f N a t u r e ; for, as e v e r y a c t i o n was g o i n g to b e w e a r i s o m e in itself, e v e n
t h o s e t h a t w o u l d b e n a t u r a l , . . , h e t h e r e f o r e s e a s o n e d e v e r y action with a c e r t a i n
a l l u r e m e n t o f p l e a s u r e ; a n d t h e m o r e n e c e s s a r y t h e p a r t i c u l a r act was to be, e i t h e r
for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e e n t i r e race o r for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l
b e i n g , t h e g r e a t e r h e willed t h e p l e a s u r e to be. Iv
Gassendi insists that animate beings would do nothing for their preservation if it were not for the realization, instinctually implanted by God, that
these actions will lead eventually to a surfeit of pleasure over pain. Thus,
Gassendi has introduced God's providence into the Epicurean system by
means of a cardinal Epicurean principle itself. The natural desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, supplemented by the natural ability of the reasonable creature to calculate what will bring him pleasure or pain in the long
run, becomes the "invisible hand" of God, guiding man along his foreordained path while, as we shall see later, not denying him the use of free
will.18
Once Gassendi has finished his discussion of happiness in Part i of the
"Ethics," with its copious recapitulation and defense of the entire Epicurean moral system, he turns to a much more comprehensive development
~7 Ibid., p. 7Ol. "Admirari nos potius decet eam fuisse solertiam sapientissimi Naturae
Opificis; ut, quia omnis operatio futura ex se laboriosa erat; etiam quae natura[is f o r e t , . . .
idcirco omnem operationem blandimento quodam voluptatis condierit; ac tanto esse vehementiorem voluptatem voluerit, quanto ipsa operatio erat magis necessaria futura, sire ad totius
generis, sive ad animalis cuiusque singularis conservationem." T h e constant referral to nature,
experience, and observation persists throughout all of Gassendi's work. Sortais believes that he
is a disciple of Bacon in this (PhilosophieModerne, p. 45).
~8 In Gassendi's debate with Descartes, DisquisitioMetaphysica (Amsterdam, 1644 ), he argues
in favor of teleology and believes that the only way to prove God's existence is from the
"argument from design": "then in what way will the conviction arise either that the world was
already created by some cause or that it is governed and ruled by some moderator unless we
observe the wisdom with which all things in it are disposed?" (SelectedWorks, p. '234). Moreover,
Gassendi believes that the regularity of the design proves God's existence. Thus, natural laws in
the physical realm are the expression of God's providence (see Rochot, pp. x54-55; and Spink,
p. 88). We see here that God works by secondary causes and laws (i.e., man's own nature) in the
moral sphere as well. In this, Gassendi seems to be reflecting a long tradition that believes in the
"cunning of God," that God uses man as his unconscious instrument for fulfilling his own plan
of salvation, while man is pursuing his own conscious destiny. For Gassendi, as we shall see, this
in no way inhibits man's free will.
~44
H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
o f his own system in the "de Virtutibus," Book 2 o f the "Ethics." It is here,
within the discussion o f political p r u d e n c e , that his own contribution becomes apparent.
T h e first task o f political p r u d e n c e (Gassendi also discusses private and
familial p r u d e n c e ) is to establish the nature o f justice. Epicurus had described justice as a utilitarian contract whereby m e n swore neither to h a r m
n o r to be h a r m e d by each other. Justice, in itself, has no t r a n s c e n d e n t or
absolute value or meaning. Gassendi rejects this amoral concept and, after a
long and erudite discussion, accepts the c o m m o n p l a c e definition o f justice,
tribuendi cuique suum ius, "to r e n d e r to each one his own right." But, Gassendi
admits, "right" has been i n t e r p r e t e d in many ways by many different people.
In particular, there has been m u c h contention concerning w h e t h e r s o m e o n e
possesses right by n a t u r e (the Stoic view) or by utility (the Epicurean view).
Gassendi believes that the only way to discover what right is, and consequently what justice is, is to examine man's beginnings in the state o f n a t u r e
and his d e v e l o p m e n t in the political state. '9
Gassendi begins with the state o f nature as seen by the ancients, who
p o r t r a y e d it as either a golden or bestial age. H e does not believe that these
views necessarily contradict each other: there may have been a progressive
d e g e n e r a t i o n f r o m one to the other. In fact, he finds such a d e v e l o p m e n t
posited in Book 5 o f De Rurum Natura, the only extant description o f Epicurean political theory. According to Gassendi, Lucretius tells us that man
lived originally in a golden age, but because o f the fear o f wild beasts, the
inconveniences of solitary life, and the lust o f stronger men, he was impelled
to enter into society. Gassendi then gives an accurate Lucretian account o f
the d e v e l o p m e n t o f society. Man created society and g o v e r n m e n t out o f the
state o f n a t u r e by means o f a dual social contract, whose aim was to provide
a peaceful e n v i r o n m e n t without which individual tranquillity and happiness
would be impossible. Gassendi c o m m e n d s the Lucretian analysis o f why laws
are obeyed: so that violence is contained and a peaceful life exists for the
common good? ~
However, Gassendi is dissatisfied with the Epicurean discussion, because
it is the most sketchy on the point he desires to articulate fully: the nature o f
right. T h u s , he tells us that most m e n can be viewed in two ways:
first absolutely, or according to himself, and as he is a man; then secondly comparatively, or as he is related to others, and is a certain part or desires to be a part of
society. And certainly in the first way, he is viewed as solitary, and in a pure state of
'9 "Ethica," pp. 768ff., 786.
2o Ibid., pp. 789ft. Lucretius's dual contract consists of a contract establishing society and a
later agreement to obey legal codes. (De Natura Return, 11. 1o19-1181).
PIERRE
GASSENDI
245
nature, that is, such as man is m a d e by nature with all o f his parts, from which he is
constructed, and with all o f his faculties, by which he is instructed?'
I n this first, s o l i t a r y state, m a n is n o t s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , in t h a t h e d o e s n o t
p o s s e s s w i t h i n h i m s e l f all t h e t h i n g s h e n e e d s to m a i n t a i n life b u t m u s t s e e k
t h e m e x t e r n a l l y . H o w e v e r , n a t u r e m a k e s t h e s e necessities, f o o d a n d s h e l t e r ,
easily o b t a i n a b l e . ( I t is a n E p i c u r e a n p r i n c i p l e t h a t w h a t e v e r is n a t u r a l a n d
n e c e s s a r y c a n b e p r o c u r e d w i t h o u t difficulty.) N a t u r e also e n d o w s m a n w i t h
the innate faculty of seeking for these things and transforming them into
use. G a s s e n d i c o n c l u d e s :
T h e r e f o r e , whatever man has from nature, so that he might exist, he also has the
faculty o f maintaining and preserving himself; and o f using all things which are
necessary, conducive, and useful for this preservation. Furthermore, it is this faculty
itself, in which can be said to consist the first right of nature; consequently, however
often we use this faculty, we are j u d g e d to use a right of nature, and, in fact, the
right of nature which is primary, or than which nothing more ancient is given by
nature. 22
T h u s , m a n ' s first r i g h t is t h e ability to u s e a n y t h i n g t h a t h e c o n s i d e r s
n e c e s s a r y to p r e s e r v e his o w n life. I n t h e state o f n a t u r e , m o r e o v e r , " w h e n
o n e p e r s o n d e s i r e s a n d p u r s u e s s o m e t h i n g , t h e r e will b e o t h e r s w h o d e s i r e
a n d p u r s u e it e q u a l l y ; a n d h e n c e will a r i s e strife, r a p i n e , a n d h a t r e d . . . . ,,~3
T h e c a u s e o f c o n t e n t i o n in t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e is n o t t h a t m a n is n a t u r a l l y
v i o l e n t o r b e s t i a l , b u t r a t h e r t h a t a n y m a n h a s a r i g h t to a n y t h i n g a n d t h a t
n o o n e h a s s e c u r e p o s s e s s i o n in w h a t h e uses. I t is i m p o r t a n t to e m p h a s i z e
h e r e t h a t a l t h o u g h m a n a p p r o p r i a t e s g o o d s a n d p r o p e r t y in this p u r e , solit a r y state o f n a t u r e , h e d o e s n o t h a v e a n y s e c u r e r i g h t in t h e m . T h u s , while
~ "Ethica," p. 794: "primum quidem absolute, seu secundum se, ac ut homo est; secundo
vero comparate, seu provt refertur ad alios, & pars quaedam est, esseve appetit societatis. Ac
priore quidem modo spectatur quasi solitarius, & in purae naturae statu, hoc est, quails est a
natura factus cum omnibus suis & partibus ex quibus constat, & facuhatibus, quibus est
instructus."
'~ Ibid., pp. 794-95: "Itaque a qua natura habet homo, ut sit, habet etiam facultatem
tuendi, & conservandi se; ac usurpandi proinde omnia, quae ad hoc praestandum necessaria,
conducentia, utilia sunt. Porro facultas ista est, in qua videtur dici posse consistere Ius naturae
primarium; adeo proinde ut quotiescumque facultate hac 'utimur, lure natUrae uti censeamur;
& illo quidem primario, seu quo nullum sit a natura datum antiquius."
93 Ibid.: "ut nempe uno concupiscente prosequente aliquid, nitantur in adversum alii, qui id
pariter concupiscant, & prosequantur; ac inde enascantur rixae, rapinae, odia . . . . " Gassendi's
political doctrines bear a good deal of resemblance to those of Hobbes. There was mutual
interaction between these two philosophers, but it has not been determined specifically what
each owes to the other in the ethical and political spheres. The views vary widely. For example,
J. M. Guyau (La Morale d'Epicure et ses Rapports avec les Doctrines Contemporaines [Paris, 1917], p.
145 ) argues that Gassendi was a very strong influence on Hobbes, whereas Bloch dates the
writing of the "Ethics" on the circular argument that it shows Hobbesian influence (Philosophie
de Gassendi, pp. xxii-xxiii).
246
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
personal use o f p r o p e r t y exists in the original state o f nature, private o w n e r ship does not.
" T h e r e f o r e , " Gassendi continues, so that m a n does not have to stay in this
state, he "is m a d e a sociable animal by nature." N a t u r e " g r a n t e d [him] the
inclination to e n t e r u p o n pacts, by m e a n s o f which he m i g h t take council
with a n o t h e r a n d be t u r n e d into society rightly. T M Gassendi will later m a k e
clear that n a t u r a l right (ius naturale) can be taken in two ways: as m a n ' s
faculty for m a i n t a i n i n g life, c o m m o n to all organic beings (ius animale, or
animal right), a n d also as all his r e a s o n i n g p r o p e r t i e s (ius humanum, or the
right o f man). ~5 Both are equally natural a n d innate, but the latter allows
m a n to realize that his interests would be served best by r e m i t t i n g to s o m e
extent his n a t u r a l right in everything. It leads him to m a k e pacts with o t h e r
men, who m a k e similar remissions, leaving all with a defined a n d secure
right in those possessions r e m a i n i n g . It is at this point that private p r o p e r t y
in the traditional sense, or "Mine a n d T h i n e " as Gassendi calls it, actually
comes into being. People also realize by the ius humanum that all needs will be
m o r e easily fulfilled by the m u t u a l assistance o f others. Gassendi calls this
initial period o f social reciprocity "a state o f modified nature," and it parallels his s e c o n d a r y definition o f m a n as a p a r t of society. '~6 It seems, for
Gassendi, that this stage o f h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t serves as both a m o r e advanced state o f n a t u r e a n d the b e g i n n i n g o f h u m a n society itself. It is a
transitional p h r a s e that contains b o t h elements within itself.
We now know that m a n possesses the natural ability to reason a n d to
create society. But by what criteria does he decide to do so? It is h e r e that
the basic c o h e r e n c e o f Gassendi's system becomes a p p a r e n t , w h e n he explains that m e n f o r m societies "in which it would be p e r m i t t e d to live m o r e
comfortably, a n d thus to live m o r e pleasurably; a n d they were led to this by
nature, by r e a s o n o f which they flee evil and strive after the good. ''~7
Man f o r m s societies because he strives, because o f divine providence, to
obtain what is p l e a s u r a b l e for him and to avoid what is harmful. G o d (or
nature), by m e a n s o f m a n ' s own nature, endows m a n with this natural criterion, which initially motivates him to p u r s u e the things necessary to life a n d
~4 "Ethica," p. 795: "Factus ergo est homo a natura sociabile animal." Nature "hominem
fecit suae indigentiae intelligentem, facit tum solertem ad excogitandum, turn propensum ad
ineundum pacta, quibus illi consuleret, ac in societe commode versaretur."
~5 Ibid., p. 798.
~6 Ibid., p. 795: "Quamobrem spectandus iam homo posteriore modo, sive sociabilis est, ac
in naturae quasi modificatae statu . . . . " The concept that man uses his natural reasoning faculty, aided by experience, to improve his lot in life is found in seminal form in the original
Epicurean system.
~7 Ibid.: "in quo liceret commodius, ita iucundius vivere; idque eo ductu naturae, quo
refugiunt malum, & appetunt bonum."
PIERRE GASSENDI
e47
consequently to devise things to make life more pleasurable. Thus, the ius
humanum is the Epicurean principle of the calculation of pleasure and pain
transformed from a guide for individual action into a social dynamic propelling m a n into society.
At the very beginning of the "Ethics," Gassendi had already emphasized
the importance he was going to give the pleasure-pain principle. In the
introduction to "de Felicitate," he wrote: "But such happiness while we live
mortal life is experienced more as a wish than as a reality; and it can be
considered at most as an idea, or exemplar, and the more or less the condition of our life approaches this ideal, the more or less happy we may be
esteemed to be. ''~8 Man calculates and strives according to an idea he has of
a life happier than the one he has in his present state. Furthermore, it is this
very striving for future happiness or pleasure, even if it temporarily brings
pain, that raises m a n above the other animate beings, who lack the capacity
of forethought. T h u s Gassendi also wrote in "de Felicitate," after defining
happiness as the best possible state, where necessary goods are as plentiful as
possible and evils as minimal as possible, and life is therefore sweet and
tranquil: "Certainly, it is this happiness to which alone men seem to be able
to aspire to by natural right; since in another way, to pursue and promise
that excellent thing to himself, is to forget his own mortality, and not to
recognize that he himself is a man, that is a weak animal, and from the
condition of his nature, liable to innumerable evils and miseries. ''~
This is an interesting idea. Man is a brute, or unreasoning creature, not
only when he is in the state of nature, but whenever he fails to use his reason
"humanly." This, in part, explains the hypothetical mode of existence with
which Gassendi credits the state of nature. Thus, in his earliest discussion of
the state of nature, after describing the turmoil that would exist if everything belonged to everybody and no one had a secure claim in anything,
Gassendi comments: " T h e r e f o r e from the earliest time, it would seem to be
according to nature that every m a n should have or possess something for
himself, which it would not be legitimate for another to usurp, and this
because it is natural to d e f e n d one's security, which is null in the midst of
disputes and quarrels. '':~~ This seems to imply that a pure state of nature
2s Ibid., 66~: " V e r u m talis felicitas, d o n e c mortelem vivimus vitam, in voto potius, quam in
re est; ac potest ad s u m m u m haberi ut Idea, sive exemplar, ad quod provt magis, vel minus
vitae status accesserit, possit pro maiore, minorve felicitate reputari."
s~ Ibid.: " N e m p e haec Felicitas est, ad quam solam videntur posse homines, s e c u n d u m
naturam iure adspirare; cum sibi alioquin polliceri, affectareque eximiam illam, sit mortalitatis
suae oblivisci, n e q u e agnoscere h o m i n e m se esse, hoc est animal imbecillum & ex naturae
conditione innumeris malis, miseriisque obnoxium."
30 Ibid., p. 751: "eam ob rein res fuisse videtur ab initio usque s e c u n d u m naturam, ut
quisque haberet, possideretve aliquid sibi proprium, quod alii usurpare licitum non foret; scili-
948
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
n e v e r e x i s t e d in reality; o n l y a m o d i f i e d state existed. M a n , as he was t r u l y
h u m a n , i m m e d i a t e l y e x e r c i s e d a n exclusive r i g h t i n the p o s s e s s i o n o f c e r t a i n
goods, t h u s b e g i n n i n g the i n e v i t a b l e p r o g r e s s i o n t o w a r d the state, a n d n e g a t i n g a c o m p l e t e l y p r o p e r t y l e s s state o f n a t u r e .
W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p u r e state o f n a t u r e existed i n time, G a s s e n d i still
accepts the n o t i o n t h a t m a n is b o r n o u t s i d e o f society, a n d t h a t it takes a n
active e x e r c i s e o f r e a s o n a n d will f o r h i m to f o r m h i m s e l f i n t o societies; this
association is by pactum. T w o successive c o n t r a c t s establish the state o f " m o d i fied" n a t u r e , o r society, in w h i c h t h e r i g h t s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y
p r o p e r t y rights, a r e d e f i n e d , a n d the w e a k e r are p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t the attacks o f the s t r o n g e r by t h e m u l t i t u d e as a whole. T h e s e c o n t r a c t s are n a t u r a l , a n d the state o f affairs a n d laws e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e m are c o n s e q u e n t l y
alto n a t u r a l :
Furthermore, because of these same contracts, and after society had begun, in the
first place, that faculty [the ability and right to preserve oneself and to use anything
necessary for that preservation] was strengthened at the same time it was given up,
because it was protected from the forceful violence of other men; therefore, insofar
as a thing depends on contracts, it can be called a right of the second kind; thereafter, since the contracts themselves establish, and to a certain extent, give it [a right
of the second kind], they are called Rights. Indeed, this right, even of the second
kind, can nevertheless be called a right of nature; since it is also from nature, and
conforms to its intentions. . . . ~'
B o t h the c o n t r a c t s a n d t h e society they p r o d u c e are n a t u r a l , b e c a u s e the
first c o n t r a c t is t h e n a t u r a l r e s u l t o f m a n ' s ability to calculate w h a t is best a n d
m o s t p l e a s u r a b l e f o r h i m , a n d b e c a u s e the laws p r o d u c e d f r o m the s e c o n d
cet cum sit secundum naturam incolumitatem tueri, quails inter iurgia, iniuriasque nulla est." A.
Funkenstein, in "Natural Science and Social Theory" (in Giambattista Vico'a"Science of Humanity,
ed. G. Tagliacozzo and B. P. Verene [Baltimore, 1971], pp. to9--1l), argues that Gassendi may
have used the concept of the state of nature in a similar manner to Hobbes, as a "limiting case,"
not explaining what once existed, but rather what would exist if society disappeared. In addition, Gassendi's use of the verb "tueor" is interesting in this context. It is a legal term that
specifically refers to the defense of one's property. Lucretius, Gassendi, and later Locke, all
maintain that the defense of personal property is the main motivating factor in the formation of
the state. See D. R. Kelley, "Vera Philosophia: The Philosophic Significance of Renaissance
Jurisprudence," Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976): 267-79, for the general impact of
legal terminology on philosophic discourse.
3, "Ethica," pp. 755, 795: "facuhas ilia primum concessa veluti firmatur, dum ab aliorum vi
tuta redditur; ideo quatenus a pactis dependens appellari potest secundarium Ius; cure &
exinde ipsa pacta ipsum stabilietia, & quadamtenus dantia appellentur Iura" (p. 795). The idea
that man is naturally sociable, but that it requires an act of will for him to establish society is not
original with Gassendi. J. w. Gough, in The Social Contract (Oxford, 1957), traces this topos from
its origin in Aristotle, through medieval social-contract theories, until it becomes fairly commonplace in the seventeenth century. This passage also utilizes much legal terminology: "redditur"
can mean the assumption of jurisdiction in civil actions, and "'Iura" can be understood as ~'legat
rights."
PIERRE
GASSENDI
249
c o n t r a c t a r e f o u n d e d o n utility. G a s s e n d i , r e l y i n g o n his analysis o f the ius
humanum, believes t h a t n o t h i n g t h a t is t r u l y u s e f u l for m a n c a n be u n n a t u r a l
for h i m . T h u s , t h e u s e f u l a n d the n a t u r a l b e c o m e o n e a n d the s a m e t h i n g ,
a n d G a s s e n d i c o m m e n d s E p i c u r u s for b i n d i n g n a t u r e a n d law t o g e t h e r m o s t
securely by i n t e r p o s i n g utility. 3'~
Civil society, t h e n , is the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e o f m a n ' s n a t u r e . It is n o t s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d o n m a n , b u t r a t h e r the r e s u l t o f his o w n efforts to m a k e
h i m s e l f h a p p y a n d t r a n q u i l by s e c u r i n g his possessions. T h u s , G a s s e n d i concludes, m a n is n o t free i n t h e state o f n a t u r e w h e n he lives u n d e r c o n t i n u a l
fear o f attack, b u t r a t h e r g a i n s f r e e d o m o n l y w i t h i n society, w h e n he lives
s e c u r e l y a n d h a p p i l y : " H e n c e it h a p p e n s t h a t real a n d n a t u r a l liberty is
e x p e r i e n c e d m o r e t r u l y i n t h a t society w h e r e , so l o n g as each m a n obeys the
laws o f society (that is, his o w n laws, o r those e n a c t e d for his o w n c o n v e n i e n c e ) , h e does w h a t e v e r he wishes in all o t h e r m a t t e r s , a n d w h e r e h e has
the r i g h t in his o w n goods, w h i c h n o o n e c a n take away, b e c a u s e they a r e
d e f e n d e d by the p u b l i c p o w e r . ''~3
G a s s e n d i has n o w d e t e r m i n e d w h a t political r i g h t is: w h a t e v e r r e m a i n s i n
t h e p o w e r o f the i n d i v i d u a l a f t e r the c o n t r a c t is established. U t i l i t a r i a n conc e r n s m a y l i m i t the o r i g i n a l rights, b u t t h o s e t h a t r e m a i n are " c e r t a i n a n d
free." Law itself is f o u n d e d o n a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n p e o p l e , b u t t h e r e is n o
such t h i n g as a u n i v e r s a l c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n all p e o p l e t h a t reflects s o m e
a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e . 34 D u e to d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , such as c l i m a t e
32 "Ethica," p. 796. Sortais complains that Gassendi is egoistic and utilitarian in his ethics:
"Sans doute encore, l'amour de soi, ce d6sire de Futile et du bonheur sont le principe spontan6
de nos actions. Mais ils n'en sont pas n6cessairement le motif et la raison d6terminante." Thus,
Sortais argues that a man can abstract himself from his own utility and act disinterestedly.
Sortais has made the mistake of equating utility with expedience and not realizing its natural
status (p. 152).
33 "Ethica," p. 755: "Unde & efficitur, ut vera, naturalisque libertas deprehendatur potius in
ea societate, in qua, modo quis pareat Societatis (hoc est suis, seu in commodum suum approbatis) legibus, agit, quod superest, quicquid lubet, ac ius habet in bona propria, quae nemo alius
rapere, propter publicam potestatem vindicem possit." G. S. Brett, in The Philosophy of Gassendi
(London, 19o8), fails to see the broader implications of Gassendi's ethical theories, believing
him to be merely reiterating Epicurus, but he does realize the importance of rights in the
Gassendist system and their particular nature: "Thus we see that rights are grounded in natures, and the nature of the subject determines the character and limits of the rights. The
nature of a being is therefore best realized under laws that establish these rights" (p. ~o9).
34 "Ethica," p. 799. In this case, there seems to be a connection between Gassendi's physics
and ethics. Bloch argues very convincingly that Gassendi is a nominalist. Writing about the
Gassendist physical theories, he states: "Bref l'id6e d'essences.., n'est qu'une illusion tenant h la
nature de notre connaissance qui sep~r6 dans le concept ce qui est uni dans le &re." In other
words, there are only particulars, which our minds make into universals. The question remains
whether this denial of universals applies to the moral sphere. Certainly Gassendi denies that
there is anything like "abstract" justice, or one moral code; morality is modified by circumstances. However, as we have seen, the underlying processes, the ius humanum, appears to be
250
HISTORY
OF P H I L O S O P H Y
a n d t e r r a i n , societies d e v e l o p d i f f e r e n t l y in d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d .
T h u s , t h e r e is a g r e a t d i v e r s i t y o f c u s t o m s a n d laws. T h i s d o e s not, h o w ever, m e a n t h a t law is p u r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l in n a t u r e . A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i c u l a r laws t h e m s e l v e s m a y d i f f e r in c o n t e n t , t h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h e y a r e
e s t a b l i s h e d is n a t u r a l (the ius humanum), a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e y a r e n a t u r a l
e v e n if t h e y a r e n o t u n i v e r s a l . G a s s e n d i , in t h e m i d s t o f a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
r e l a t i v i t y o f c u s t o m s c o n c e r n i n g m o d e s t y , insists t h a t o n e m u s t o b e y t h e
c u s t o m s o f a n y society while living in it, b e c a u s e "while e i t h e r n a t u r e , o r
law, o r c u s t o m m a y m a k e a t h i n g p r o p e r , it is n a t u r e itself w h i c h o r d e r s it
to b e m a i n t a i n e d , i n s o f a r as it m a y s e r v e t h e c o m m o n g o o d , o n t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f w h i c h d e p e n d s t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l , w h i c h is
n a t u r a l f o r e v e r y o n e . ''35 T h e n o n u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e c o n t r a c t also m e a n s
t h a t t h e r e is n o n a t u r a l law e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y since o n e
o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f law is t h a t it has t h e ability to c o m p e l , w h i c h is
impossible among people of diverse customs) 6
T h e t e r m "law o f n a t u r e " (lex naturae) also gives G a s s e n d i s o m e difficulty.
H e will n o t a c c e p t s o m e t h i n g as a law u n l e s s t h e r e is a pact, b u t h e c o n c e d e s
t h a t ex similitudine ( f o l l o w i n g A r i s t o t l e ) , t h e u n i v e r s a l d i c t a t e s o f r e a s o n c a n
be c o n s i d e r e d as n a t u r a l law (Lex Naturalis). I n fact t h e r e is n o t h i n g to
d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s e n a t u r a l laws f r o m t h e ius humanum. A n d so h e writes:
" B e c a u s e i n d e e d , t h e n a t u r a l law, in t h e s a m e m a n n e r as t h e n a t u r a l r i g h t ,
u s u a l l y is o b s e r v e d a m o n g m e n p a r t i c u l a r l y ; f o r this r e a s o n , a few a r t i c l e s o f
this r i g h t m a y b e s i n g l e d o u t , w h i c h c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as so m a n y laws o f
nature...
[ a n d ] w h i c h s e e m to b e m o s t c o m m o n a m o n g all m e n . '''-~7 T h e
sources he enunciates are familiar from the previous discussion of natural
r i g h t . First, a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , m a n p u r s u e s t h e g o o d a n d flees f r o m t h e
evil. S e c o n d , a m a n will love h i m s e l f b e f o r e all o t h e r s a n d p r e f e r t h e g o o d
universal, at least potentially, among men. Thus, although universal concepts are denied, universal similarities among men remain. This is very close to the Epicurean concept and anticipates Locke.
:~5 "Ethica," p. 778: "seu natura, seu lex, seu consuetudo decorum faciat, ipsa est natura,
quae tueri id iubet, quatenus servatur ob commune bonum, ex cuius incolumitate, pendet
singularis incolumitas, quae est unicuique secundum naturam." A. Adam, in "Gassendi:
L'Influence Posthume" (in Gassendi: Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre, p. 17o), believes that the idea of
natural right founded upon the laws, traditions, and manners of man, "lorsqu'il fonde ainsi un
vertible empirisme historique... , " is in its origins a Gassendist doctrine.
36 "Ethica," p. 799. Gassendi, in the Exercitationes Paradoxicae, anticipated this doctrine of
cultural relativity in a nominalistic explanation of language: "For men have agreed to call the
color of snow whiteness and to call whatever is infused with the same color white. But who
knows whether I see it red, or another man sees it green?... In fact it is necessary that the term
by which a certain thing is designated in a society be absolutely fixed even if it is possible that
various appearances are represented by the single term..." (Selected Works, p. 92).
37 "Ethica," p. 8oo: "Quia vero, ut Lex Naturalis, sic lus Naturale attendi in hominibus
potissimum solet; ideo ut seligantur pauca huiusce luris capita, quae & haberi totidem quasi
Naturae leges possint.., quae esse omnimn hominum maxime communia videatur."
PIERRE G A S S E N D I
251
for h i m s e l f r a t h e r t h a n for another. T h i r d , a m a n will seek to p r e s e r v e his
life a n d all c o n c o m i t a n t things that go with it. A n d fourth, a m a n will be
sociable a n d will c o m e t o g e t h e r with o t h e r m e n to live in society. 3s U n d e r l y ing a n d m o t i v a t i n g t h e m all is the first premise: m a n will strive for what is
pleasurable a n d avoid what is painful.
Because o f n a t u r a l a n d h u m a n right, therefore, the state is established
(coendo). As I have m e n t i o n e d , initially t h e r e is only one pact, a social contract, w h e r e b y the multitv, de f o r m themselves into a society in o r d e r to
insure the secure rights o f each individual in his possessions. T o achieve this
aim, they r e m i t their original right in everything. By a second pact, laws are
established to g o v e r n their intercourse with one another. T h u s , justice comes
into b e i n g as a m e a n s o f redress to restore rights that have b e e n violated a n d
is wholly d e p e n d e n t on the p r i o r existence o f established rights; it possesses
no i n d e p e n d e n t , ontological status o f its o w n ? 9 T h e second social pact
creates laws a n d justice at the same time: laws to p r e s e r v e each m a n in his
secure a n d u n i q u e rights, a n d justice to p r e v e n t o t h e r m e n f r o m encroaching on these rights a n d to punish t h e m if they do so. T h e s e rights, it should
be noted, are rights to p r o p e r t y as well as to life a n d f r e e d o m .
A l t h o u g h the original social contract r e m o v e d m a n y o f the inconveniences o f the state o f nature, some difficulties r e m a i n e d . Within society,
however, m e n are still g u i d e d by their reason to p u r s u e what is best for
themselves, a n d consequently, for naturally utilitarian reasons they m a k e a
third contract, to delegate authority to a g o v e r n m e n t . Again b o r r o w i n g f r o m
Lucretius, Gassendi explains: "Because it would be inconvenient for the
whole m u l t i t u d e to c o m e t o g e t h e r to decide something, a n d individually (or
even by tribe) to state an opinion, or to cast a vote; for this reason, the
m u l t i t u d e itself will willingly t r a n s f e r this p o w e r either to a few persons, or
to s o m e o n e p e r s o n . . . . -4o G o v e r n m e n t is not divine, therefore, except incidentally, as a p r o d u c t o f m a n ' s providentially inspired pursuit o f pleasure. It
is natural, because it is a p r o d u c t o f a natural process.
I n the resulting state structure, according to Gassendi, sovereignty c a n n o t
38 Ibid., pp. 800-802.
39 Ibid., p. 786.
40 Ibid., p. 755: "quia incommodum foret, ad decernendum quidlibet totam multitudinem
convenire, & sigillatim (aut etiam per tribus) dicere sententiam, suffragiumve ferre; idcirco ipsa
multitudo potestatem hanc vel pauco, vel in unurn aliquem sponte transluerit..." Gough calls
this the "contract of government" or "contract of submission." The idea of this kind of contract,
although rooted in the Middle Ages, developed extensively among the Calvinist and .Jesuit
"monarchomachi" of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in order to justify rebellion
or even tyrannicide (see Gough, pp. 62ff.). Bloch CGassendi and the Transition," p. 52) asserts
that the dual or triple social contract (the contract of association and the contract of submission)
we find in Gassendi may be the earliest formulation of this kind of political theory found in the
seventeenth century. Although I agree that this looks forward to Locke and the liberal tradition
of the eighteenth century, I must emphasize that it also looks backward to the dual contract
252
HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y
be divided.
It must reside in either the monarch,
the optimates, or the
p e o p l e . A l t h o u g h t h e r e m a y b e a s e m b l a n c e o f m i x e d g o v e r n m e n t i n a state,
i n a c t u a l i t y o n l y o n e u n i t o f t h e state p o s s e s s e s t h e s u p r e m e p o w e r , a n d this
determines
w h a t k i n d o f state it will be. O f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h r e e k i n d s o f
government,
G a s s e n d i f a v o r s m o n a r c h y b e c a u s e it p r o v o k e s t h e f e w e s t diffi-
c u l t i e s ( o n e m a n c a n e x e c u t e laws m o r e e f f i c i e n t l y t h a n s e v e r a l ) , a n d t h e s e
can be remedied
by either succession or election?' Furthermore,
empirical
e v i d e n c e s h o w s us t h a t t h e r u l e o f o n e is best: t h e h o m e h a s o n e m a s t e r , t h e
army one general, the universe has one ruler. Gassendi consistently equates
t h e state to t h e h o m e , a n d h e m a k e s u s e o f this a n a l o g y to c l a r i f y his o p i n ions on various matters.
G a s s e n d i d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , f a v o r u n c o n d i t i o n a l m o n a r c h y . I n his d i s c u s sion of political prudence,
he writes: "Therefore,
the duties of the ruler
p e r t a i n to t w o t i m e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , n a m e l y , w a r a n d p e a c e ; i n g e n e r a l , c e r t a i n
t h i n g s o u g h t to b e c o n s i d e r e d by h i m e s p e c i a l l y . A n d , i n t h e first place, t h a t
h e s h o u l d h o l d f i x e d in his s o u l t h e a i m a n d e n d f o r t h e s a k e o f w h i c h h e
r u l e s , a n d to w h i c h h e is s u b s e r v i e n t . T h i s t r u l y is t h e h e a l t h , s e c u r i t y , a n d
u t i l i t y o f t h e p e o p l e . . . . ,,4, L a t e r , i n his a n a l y s i s " O f J u s t i c e , R i g h t , a n d
found in Lucretius. In addition, Bloch's assertion that the state is not "properly founded" until
the establishment of government by the third contract is also open to interpretation. Gassendi
never directly addresses the question of when the state itself is founded. The text implies that
some form of state exists as soon as the multitude form a society, and particularly after the
society begins to make laws. So, at the end of his discussion of natural law, Gassendi writes
("Ethica," p. 8o0 "leges, quae ad societatem civilem sanciendam statuuntur, in utilitatem communem, communve bonum ferantur..." ("the laws, which are decreed in order to produce a
civil society, are produced for the common utility or the common good..."). The words "civil
society" seem to indicate that some form of state is produced by the establishment of law, which
Gassendi clearly places before the delegation of authority to one or more leaders. During the
discussion of natural law, Gassendi links state and society even more explicitly (p. 799): "non
possit tamen una omnium, qui sub iisdem legibus vivant, conciliari societas; idcirco ineunt
coetus varios, sive specialeis societates, quae sic regantur legibus, pactionibusve specialibus, ut
facuhati uniuscuiusque agendi, utendi, praescribatur modus. Quare & quod specialisquaeque
huiusmodi societas in una, aut multiplici civitate vivere soleat..." ("still one society cannot be
produced of everybody who lives under the same laws; for this reason, various assemblages, or
special societies began, which were governed by laws or special contracts, so that a way was
prescribed for using and for directing the ability of each individual. And therefore, because
each society is of this special kind, one is accustomed to live in either one or in a multiple
state..."). Furthermore, in both places where Gassendi speaks of "the highest power," this
power is associated with the multitude who make law rather than with the government, which is
created by the third contract (pp. 755, 795). If sovereignty is the mark of statehood rather than
an institutional framework, then Gassendi implies that the state itself predates its government.
4, "Ethica," pp. 756-58. Gassendi certainly seems to follow Bodin in this definition of
sovereignty (see G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory [New York, 1937], pp. 4o5ff.).
4~ "Ethica," p. 758: "Itaque munera Imperantis, cure ad duo speciatum tempora pertineant,
Belli videlicet, ac Pacis; turn quaedam generatim sunt illi maxime attendenda. Ac primum
quidem, ut animo defixum scopum, ac finem teneat, cuius gratia praeest, ipsique paretur. Is
vero est Populi salus, securitas, utilitas . . . . "
PIERRE
GASSENDI
253
Laws," Gassendi explicitly claims that the people always retain some power
o f consent after the contract o f g o v e r n m e n t has been made: "next some laws
were layed d o w n by the princes; but it should be understood, nevertheless,
that the consent o f the people intervened, either e x p r e s s l y . . , or tacitly,
because the power had been given and had been received voluntarily. ''43
Gassendi follows this passage with many o f the arguments traditionally used
by those arguing for some f o r m o f popular sovereignty, or the right o f
resistance to an absolute ruler; for example, he cites the lex regia and includes a long discussion o f the difference between a king (the s h e p h e r d o f
his people, who rules according to law) and a tyrant (the wolf o f his people,
who cares only for himself). 44
It is no mystery why Gassendi is drawn to arguments against absolutism.
T h e y were traditionally associated with theories o f the social contract, and
they follow logically f r o m his own political philosophy. T h e entire purpose
o f g o v e r n m e n t is to secure the greatest happiness o f the individual; the
individual, t h e r e f o r e , will not give the g o v e r n m e n t the irrevocable right to
tyrannize him. Gassendi does not, however, draw any final implications f r o m
these arguments. H e does not d e f e n d the right o f the people to rebel;
rather, in this discussion, he follows traditional theories of obedience. During his discussion o f public calamities (war, tyranny, the subversion o f the
state, etc.), he says: "Since we may not change fate, or if you please, the
decrees o f eternal providence; it is better to soften the harshness by o u r own
consent to these things, r a t h e r than to exasperate them m o r e by fruitless
opposition. ''45 T h e king should always be held in reverence, because otherwise " p e r t u r b a t i o n " and "calamity" would follow. 46 Even here, although this
is a traditional a r g u m e n t in favor o f political passivity, the pleasure-pain
principle operates. In the long run, happiness is better served by obeying
r a t h e r than by rebelling. And, as we have already seen, one of the things
that r e c o m m e n d s m o n a r c h y most is that its inconveniences are t e m p o r a r y
and can be r e m o v e d by succession or election.
Gassendi believes that it is in the best interests o f the king himself not to
be a tyrant. A king is also a man and is liable to the same desires that
43 Ibid., p. 796: "deinceps quidem latae quaedam leges a Principibus fuerint; sed intelligatur
nihilominus intervenisse Populi consensus, & ille quidem, aut expressus... , aut tacitus, ob
potestatem datam, & acceptionem ultraneum."
44 Ibid., pp. 757, 796. Gough discusses the relation of these arguments to a belief in popular
sovereignty (The Social Contract, pp. 2 lif0. The lex regia can also be used to justify absolutism, if
consent is given irretrievably.
45 "Ethica," p. 769: "Cure rata, seu mavis decreta aeternae providentiae immutare non
liceat; satius esse proprio assensu eorum lenire asperitatem, quam tenisu adhibito ipsa magis
exasperare."
46 Ibid., p. 813.
~54
HISTORY
OF P H I L O S O P H Y
characterize any man. His chief aim, like e v e r y o n e else's, will be tranquillity
o f the soul and lack o f pain in the body. But, for him as a n y o n e else,
tranquillity is impossible without virtue, and without private p r u d e n c e in his
own life, "because even in the p e r s o n a o f h e a d o f h o u s e h o l d a n d prince, he
is a private m a n , for w h o m it is always necessary to be o f high character, and
will p r o v e to be so m u c h m o r e suitable for ruling others, the m o r e he knows
how to rule himself, a n d to o r d e r his own passions. ''47
Gassendi's good king will t h e r e f o r e conduct himself virtuously, for the
good not only o f his c o u n t r y but o f himself. T h e people shall love and
r e v e r e n c e him, a n d he will live peacefully. Gassendi is not naive a b o u t politics; simple virtue will not always suffice in a world p l a g u e d by m i s g u i d e d
subjects and external enemies. So, in the section on political p r u d e n c e , a n d
elsewhere in the "Ethics," he gives a list o f detailed and intricate rules conc e r n i n g the r u n n i n g o f a country. For example, Gassendi advises the king to
distribute justice "exquisitely," to tax justly and i n f o r m the p e o p l e why there
are taxes, to m a i n t a i n a strong a r m y a n d use spies, and to punish the leaders
o f seditions harshly, but to be lenient with the followers, a n d so on. I n the
section c o n c e r n i n g familiar p r u d e n c e , similar m a x i m s are given for the running o f the h o m e , reflecting Gassendi's belief in the h o m e - k i n g d o m analogy.
T h e head o f the h o u s e h o l d is advised to delegate some duties to the wife, so
that she will feel herself p a r t o f the family and be a s u p p o r t to h e r husband.
T h e h u s b a n d should not, however, give in to her too much, or else his
r e g i m e will be subverted. Likewise, the king should distribute offices to the
aristocracy in o r d e r to gain their loyalty, but also to d e m o n s t r a t e to t h e m
that he has sufficient authority to destroy any sedition. 48 This certainly is not
constitutionalism, but neither is it an e n d o r s e m e n t o f absolutism. It has the
flavor o f the "politiques" and "raison d'6tat." Still, when it is c o m b i n e d with
his r e t e n t i o n o f the people's right to consent to law, one can see why Gassendi is seen by s o m e as the p r e c u r s o r o f political liberalism in the eighteenth a n d n i n e t e e n t h centuries. 4~
~7 Ibid., p. 659: "quod etiam sub ipsa persona Patrisfamilias ac Principis sit privatus Homo,
quem esse alioquin bene moratu oporteat, quique tanto magis idoneus aliis regendis sit evasurus, quanto seipsum regere, affectibusque suis imperare norit."
48 Ibid., pp. 751-6o.
4~ H. H6ffding (A History of Modern Philosophy, ~ vols. [New York, a955], ]: 378) believes that
Locke was strongly influenced by Gassendi. Berr (Scepticisme de Gassendi, p. 17) thinks that
Gassendi was an excellent center for all those opposed to the reigning principles of the seventeenth century. Bloch argues that Gassendi was originally very close to the feudal class (the
potential Frondists) in his political loyalties but later in life came to believe that monarchy was
better. Still, he adds, "the feudal elements in Gassendi's work may have unconsciously effected
the growth of political liberalism through the writings of Locke" (Philosophie de Gassendi, pp.
49o-95). Gassendi himself realized the democratic element present in Epicureanism, which
implies a consciousness of his own liberalism. In chap. ~ of De Vita et Moribus Epicuris, he writes
PIERRE GASSENDI
255
Within a discussion o f "Political Prudence," Gassendi cannot ignore the
p r o b l e m o f the duties as well as the rights o f the citizen, particularly since
E p i c u r e a n i s m u r g e s political abstention. Gassendi's first a p p r o a c h to this
p r o b l e m is very simple. H e denies that Epicurus ever unequivocally advocated lathe biosas; "Epicurus did not say this absolutely, but only with that
condition, 'Unless s o m e t h i n g intervenes . . . . ,-5o I f one's country is in
d a n g e r , it is the d u t y o f every citizen to participate in its defense, since the
c o u n t r y is like a p a r e n t to all m e n and comes before a n y t h i n g else. H a p p i ness is impossible for the individual if the c o u n t r y is in turmoil. However,
short o f this kind o f dire necessity, Gassendi sees n o t h i n g s h a m e f u l in leading a retired life. I n fact, this is the goal most m e n labor toward d u r i n g their
entire lives, to be able to s p e n d their old age in c o m f o r t and tranquility. As
always, one should strive for the greatest good, pleasure, and seek to avoid
the greatest evil, pain. I n the case o f the private citizen, this m e a n s living a
quiet life unless the m i s f o r t u n e o f the c o u n t r y threatens to e n g u l f his own
pleasure. 5'
Still, Gassendi realizes that it often h a p p e n s that the desires o f an individual m a y lead to distress b o t h for him a n d for his country. In some men, the
calculus o f pleasure a n d pain m a y go awry. (Indeed, if all m e n calculated
correctly f r o m the beginning, there would be no n e e d for the state at all.)
A n d so, Gassendi writes: "! u n d e r s t a n d assuredly that this ( i m m o d e r a t e )
desire is natural; consequently, it is discovered to thrive also in boys a n d
even in brutes; a n d there is no one, who, however m u c h he pretends that he
shuns it, does not recognize that he is always held by his appetite, so that he
could not lay it aside if he wished to. ''5~ I n this circumstance, it is the duty o f
the state, a n d the wiser m e n in it, to teach m a n that there is a reward in
virtue i t s e l f - - t h e greatest reward, because virtuous actions result both in the
exultation o f the m i n d f r o m the praises o f others a n d in a feeling o f heighte n e d security while p u r s u i n g the pleasures of life.
M a n is not b o r n completely h a p p y or completely virtuous, but he has the
that the Stoics became enraged against Epicurus because the? recognized "the simplicity of his
doctrine and the childlikeness of his words, and the vast promise for men only a little wise. . . . "
For Gassendi's influence on Locke, see R. S. WestfaU, Scienceand Religion m SeventeenthCentury
England (New Haven, 1958), p. 17; R. I. Aaron, John Locke (Oxford, 1963), pp. a3, ~6; E. A.
Driscoll, "The Influence of Gassendi on Locke's Hedonism," International Philosophical Quarterly
1~ (1972): 89-9 o.
50 "Ethica," p. 762: "non id absolute dixisse Epicurum, sed ea solum conditione, 'Nisi quid
intervenerit"; and ibid., p. 813.
5~ Ibid., p. 7o3 .
5~ Ibid., p. 7o6: "profecto esse naturale eius (immoderate) desiderium video; adeo vigere in
peuris quoque, ac etiam in brutis deprehenditur, nemoque est, qui quantumcumque se cum
sirnulet aversari, non agnoscat se eius semper appetitu ita teneri, ut exuere ipsum, si velit, non
possit."
256
H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
capacity for improving himself by the use of his faculty of reasoning; he can
learn to be happy and acquire virtue by habit. Indeed, without this ability
and motivation to acquire and desire the good, man would not even be
human. Thus, at the very beginning of the "Ethics," Gassendi writes:
and scarcely no one denies that the virtues are good habits and the vices are bad
habits; it is agreed, assuredly, that a habit is acquired by exercising a custom. I say
scarcely no one; since men are not lacking, who believe virtue to be furnished not by
custom, or by law, but only by nature, o r . . . the Goddess of Fate. Although this may
be true of virtue as original and imperfected, or of the seeds of virtue, still it seems
that virtue is not perfected and made constant, without instruction and practice in
acting correctly and honestly.53
Since m a n is not born virtuous and happy, he will labor to become so
from his natural desire to strive for the good. But most men, since their
wisdom is not perfected, consider the transitory pleasures of movement and
the material goods o f possessions sufficient to insure their happiness. Their
motivation is natural, but their j u d g m e n t is somewhat clouded, because they
put the pleasures of motion before the pleasures of rest. (Of course, as an
Epicurean and a pragmatist, Gassendi does not disparage these pleasures if
they are pursued in moderation. T h e y are subsidiary and necessary for
complete tranquility.) Nevertheless, this pursuit of useful and honest goods,
for the pleasure they bring, is the motivating factor behind almost all of the
actions we p e r f o r m in life. ~4
Gassendi knows, however, from the teachings of Epicurus and from his
own observations, that pleasure is finite in nature; it consists in fulfilling a
need, and if it is pursued beyond that point, it will bring pain. I f a man does
not realize that tranquility is a finite and final good, his pursuit of the good
will lead him constantly to seek more pleasure. Gassendi writes, " S i n c e . . .
those things that he possesses already, count for nothing [to him] . . . . he
searches for delight in procuring those things which he thinks he lacks. ''55
Although Gassendi does not entirely approve of this process, he realizes
53 Ibid., p. 659: "ac n e m o fere non admittat esse Virtutes bonos, & Vitias malos habitus;
constat profecto habitus consuetudine agendi acquiri. N e m i n e m ferre dico; quoniam non defuere, qui censuerint virtutem non consuetudine, aut doctrina, sed sola natura, a u t . . . Divina
s o r t e . . , parari. Quod quidem tametsi sit verum de virtute quasi inchoata, seu de virtutis
seminibus, videtur tamen Virtus perfecta, & constans, citra doctrinam, c o n s e u t u d i n e m q u e recte
ac honeste agendi, non esse."
54 Ibid., pp. 7o3ff., 725 . T h e distinction between types o f pleasure goes back to original
Epicurean doctrine. Epicurus wrote, " F r e e d o m from trouble in the mind and from pain in the
body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving
motion" (Extant Remains, p. 12 l ).
5~ "Ethica," p. 7o3: " Q u i p p e . . . ea, quae iam habet, pro nihilo sint . . . . oblectationem in
parandis iis, quae sibi deesse reputat, conquirit."
PIERRE GASSENDI
257
that it is natural and that the striving involved in it is what makes man truly
h u m a n . Gassendi is f o r m u l a t i n g a work-ethic c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the realities
o f his own period. It works on two levels. In the first instance, as we have
seen, the m a n w h o m Gassendi describes as developing f r o m the state o f
n a t u r e is a p r o d u c t o f his own labor u p o n himself. Although God providentially endows m a n with the capacity for humanizing himself t h r o u g h the
pursuit o f pleasure, the process is entirely in the hands o f the individual.
(Later, we will see how this relates to Gassendi's concept o f free will.) T h e
state that m a n creates is a p r o d u c t o f his labor, motivated naturally by the
calculus o f pleasure a n d pain. T h e path any one man pursues in life depends almost entirely o n his own e f f o r t to obtain what he believes to be good
for himself. Psychologically, the desire to labor is explained and justified as
completely natural, f r o m a man's birth until he attains the correct u n d e r standing o f happiness and rests tranquilly without perturbation o f mind or
pain o f the body. T h e n he is wise. 56
But Gassendi is not content with this formulation o f tranquility and contemplation as the ultimate ends o f life, although he is quick to point out that
peace o f mind is not torpor. While maintaining f r o m the very beginning o f
the "Ethics" that the contemplative life is h a p p i e r than the active life, he
nevertheless urges that moral philosophy shou[d be active r a t h e r than speculative in n a t u r e s This seeming contradiction is resolved in a n u m b e r o f
ways. Most i m p o r t a n t l y - - a n d this is the second level o f Gassendi's workethic--tranquility, r a t h e r than divorcing a man f r o m affairs, becomes a tool
for success in business: "thus the soul is cal'led tranquil, not only when one
lives in leisure, but also, especially, when one undertakes great and excellent
things, without internal agitation and with an even t e m p e r a m e n t . ''~s A wise
man knows how to calculate correctly in o r d e r to insure the greatest a m o u n t
o f success. H e will use his faculty o f p r u d e n c e to j u d g e his own abilities in
any matter, to weigh the capacities o f others, and to utilize his past experiences to help this enterprise. 59 In short, he will be p r e p a r e d for every contingency; and if by some chance he does fail, he will not be destroyed, because
he always retains his i n n e r tranquility and the knowledge that he did the best
he could.
Finally, realizing that it is impossible for any person entirely to foresake
36 Ibid., p. 715.
57 Ibid., pp. 66o, 717, 72o.
5s Ibid., p. 717 . "ita animus dicatur tranquillus, non solum qui in otio degit, sed maxime
etiam, qui magna, & praeclara quaedam molitur absque intestina sui agitatione, temerationeque
aequabilitatis."
59 Ibid., pp. 745ft.
258
HISTORY
OF P H I L O S O P H Y
the pleasures of motion for the pleasures of rest and tranquility, Gassendi
reiterates his theory that God implanted the desire for pleasure within man
in order to motivate him to develop his potential, to make himself truly
human. At some point in this process, some men realize that although the
pleasures of motion and the nonnecessary pleasures such as honors and
riches are goods, the greatest good is tranquility of the mind and lack of
pain in the body, for which we need only the bare necessities of life. These
men become wise, therefore, and are the only men who approach complete
happiness. However, they only approach happiness; they do not achieve it:
"the condition of mortality prevents one from being blessed in every part;
and that highest happiness, which is the absence always of every perturbation and pain, and the accumulation always of every pleasure, is of God
alone, and of those who are transfigured, because of his immense goodness,
into a better life. ''6~ Thus, although a man may perceive true pleasure, he is
doomed by being human to a life of striving after pleasure without achieving
it, except in its mundane and transitory forms.
Why does Gassendi believe that God denies man the ability to attain
complete happiness? The answer lies in Gassendi's interpretation of the
doctrine of free will. Agreeing with Epicurus and the Catholic Church, Gassendi utterly condemns predestination: "Because if our souls, when they are
established in the material world, are ruled by fate; if our souls are destitute
of liberty, if they are immobilized by necessity, [if] they do everything unavoidably and inevitably, the reason of human life perishes; nor can there be
any place for deliberations . . . . Hence prudence will be utterly in vain; the
study of wisdom will be in vain . . . . ,61 The final result of a belief in predestination is that no man can be praised or blamed according to his actions. In
particular, the ius humanum, the ability of man to reason and plan, is lost,
and the whole human creation becomes pointless.
According to Gassendi, liberty is primarily in the intellect and secondarily
in the will. Free will consists in indifference: the ability to choose or reject an
alternative, or to change one's mind after a course has been decided when
weightier reasons prevail in favor of the opposite course. The intellect must
always choose the course that seems best to it (as a balance must incline to
the heavier side), but the evaluating of evidence is entirely in the power of
60 Ibid., p. 717: "obstat conditio mortalitatis, ne ab o m n i parte beatis liceat; & felicitas ilia
s u m m a o m n i s o m n i n o perturbationis, dolorisque expers, o m n i o m n i n o v o l u p t a t e m g e n e r e cumulatissima, solius Dei est, e o r u m q u e q u o d transfert, p r o sua ilia bonitate i m m e n s a , in meliorein vitam."
6, Ibid., p. 83x: " q u o d si animi q u o q u e nostri, c u m sint in r e r u m serie constituti, Fato
r e g a n t u r ; si libertate destituti, necessitate immobili, ineluctabili, inevitabili o m n i a faciant, perit
h u m a n a e vitae ratio; n e q u e o m n i n o esse ullus consultationi locus potest . . . . Heinc vana p r o r s u s
erit Prudentia; v a n u m s t u d i u m sapientiae . . . . "
PIERRE GASSENDI
259
the i n d i v i d u a l m a n . O n c e the intellect has d e c i d e d w h a t a c t i o n to take, the
will m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y follow to a c c o m p l i s h the action. ~'~
G a s s e n d i d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n a "willing action" (Spontaneam), a n d a
"free a c t i o n "
(Liberam). A w i l l i n g a c t i o n is like a n i n v o l u n t a r y i m p u l s e o f
n a t u r e ; it is c o m m o n to stones, b r u t e s , a n d boys, all c r e a t u r e s w i t h o u t the
ability to r e a s o n . T h u s , a s t o n e will fall to the g r o u n d willingly, b u t n o t
freely, b e c a u s e t h e r e was n o t a p r i o r i n d i f f e r e n c e in the m i n d o f the s t o n e
d u r i n g w h i c h it d e c i d e d to fall. Likewise, the i m p u l s e o f a n y a n i m a t e b e i n g
to p u r s u e t h e g o o d is i n v o l u n t a r y , b e c a u s e all a p p e t i t e s are i n c l i n e d t o w a r d
the g o o d f r o m t h e i r o w n n a t u r e . W i l l i n g n e s s (Libentia) c h a r a c t e r i z e s the
saints as well, b e c a u s e t h e y k n o w a n d u n d e r s t a n d the h i g h e s t g o o d c o m pletely a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t f o r e s a k e it. 63 T h e r e t o r e , a c c o r d i n g to G a s s e n d i ,
c o m p l e t e h a p p i n e s s is e q u i v a l e n t to t h e loss o f free will, b e c a u s e n o i n d i f f e r e n c e r e m a i n s i n t h e soul, n o e l e m e n t o f d e l i b e r a t i o n persists. F r e e will is in
the last analysis the ius humanum, the ability o f m a n to calculate w h a t c o u r s e
is best to o b t a i n t h e g r e a t e s t p l e a s u r e a n d avoid p a i n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , Gass e n d i s u m m a r i z e s his a r g u m e n t i n the f o l l o w i n g way:
It is agreed, then, because while we live mortal life, we are weak, little men, nor can
we promise ourselves unchangeability either of j u d g m e n t , or of will, and display
constancy; certainly [this is] because of indifference, by means of which both the
62 Ibid., pp. 8~2ff. Gassendi defines his theory of the freedom of the intellect in the following manner: "censetur esse in homine Ratio libera, Liberum-ve arbitrium; quatenus ex pluribus
rebus in deliberationem cadentibus, non ita unam eligit, quin vel ipsum negligere, vel eligere
aliam possit. Ac attribuere quidem solent hanc Liberatatem Voluntati, seu rationali appetitui;
verumtamen perinde est, quatenus fatentur libertatis radicem in ipsa Ratione, ipsove InteUectu,
hoc est, facultate cognoscente esse. Quippe adrnittunt Voluntatem esse facultatem, seu potentiam caecarn, quae nisi intellectu praecunte, ut facem quasi praeferent procedere quoquam non
possit; adeo proinde, ut cure proprium Intellectus sit lucendo praeire, & Voluntatis sic ipsum
sequi, ut deflecti a tramite coepto, nisi se ille alio convertat, lucemque flectat, potis non sit;
idcirco videatur Libertas, in Intellectu quidem primo, ac per se; in Voluntate autem secundatio,
ac dependenter esse.., videtur primum natura Libertatis consistere in Indifferentia, qua facultas libera vocata ferri, aut non ferri ad aliquid potest (quam Contradictionis liberatem vocant)
aut sic ferri ad unam, ut possit ad oppositum (quam appellant Contrarietatis). Certe, cum
Libertas non possit sine facultate eligendi intelligi, constat ibi solum esse electionem, ubi indifferentia est...(p. 8~2).
63 Ibid., pp. 892-23. "'Spontaneam" has been defined as a "willing" action, because although
it is determined by outside forces, it is not coerced. The subject undertakes the action with
complete assent, because it is entirely within his own nature to act in such a way. Thus, it is not
an unthinking action; nevertheless, it is impossible for the subject to act differently. Therefore,
according to Gassendi, he is not free.
It is difficult to understand how Gassendi could have credited inanimate objects with any
kind of volitional impulses, but this kind of analogy (between rocks falling and the human will
seeking the good) becomes clearer if seen within the perspective of Aristotelian physics, where a
rock falls because it is seekingits natural place. One of the things most disturbing to the New
Science of the seventeenth century was these "occult qualities" of inanimate objects.
260
HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY
intelligence and the will can pass from the true to the apparent good, from the good
to the apparent better; for this reason, only the future life is left in which indifference of this kind ceases . . . . 64
F r o m first to last, t h e r e f o r e , we can see the unifying t h r e a d that binds
Gassendi's m o r a l a n d political philosophy into one, c o h e r e n t whole. T h e ius
humanum, i m p l a n t e d by God, m a k e s m a n h u m a n , a social being, a n d free. It
m e a n s that m a n is a constantly striving creature, striving a f t e r a g o a l - c o m p l e t e h a p p i n e s s - - t h a t he c a n n o t reach because he is a man, whose freed o m ultimately consists in the ability mistakenly to choose the lesser and
m o r e i m m e d i a t e g o o d r a t h e r than the ultimate good. Man's destiny, however, remains in his own hands. A l t h o u g h there are some elements o f fate
a n d f o r t u n e that r e m a i n b e y o n d his grasp, he himself is within his own
power, a n d he can so o r d e r his life as to obtain the m a x i m u m o f pleasure
possible for a m a n . G o d ' s p o w e r a n d p r o v i d e n c e r e m a i n u n i m p a i r e d by
m a n ' s free will; indeed, by constantly seeking m o r e pleasure, free will becomes the device G o d uses for providentially directing m a n and the world
toward the good. While G o d knows omnisciently what a m a n will decide, a n d
a l t h o u g h H e is the p r i m a r y source o f m a n ' s reasoning capacities in their
innate beginnings, the act o f j u d g m e n t itself is purely h u m a n and not
p r e d e t e r m i n e d . 65 T h u s , Gassendi, starting f r o m an individualistic, nonpolitical, and antiprovidential philosophy, uses one o f its own basic premises to
develop a p h i l o s o p h y in which a m a n ' s rights a n d abilities as an individual
lead him to b e c o m e a social a n d political being, acting in accord with God's
providential guidance o f the world.
T h e key to Gassendi's t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f E p i c u r e a n i s m is the emphasis on
h u m a n f r e e d o m a n d its relationship to God and the world. Because m a n is
not p r e d e s t i n e d or fated to any particular end, he possesses the p o w e r to
m a k e himself a n d the state he lives in a n y t h i n g he wants it to be. In this case,
the state itself exists to protect the f r e e d o m o f choice, the pursuit o f happiness, that m a n received f r o m G o d as part o f his birthright. Pierre Gassendi's
r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f E p i c u r e a n ethical theory is one o f the first, if not the first,
m o d e r n defenses o f individual liberty and natural rights within society and
the political state.
Oregon State University
~4 Ibid., p. 825: "'Constat denique, quia donec mortalem vitam vivimus, homunciones imbecilli sumus, neque possumus ipsi nobis ineluctabilem polliceri, seu iudicii, seu voluntatis, propositique constantiam; scilicet ob indifferentiam, qua tam intellectus, quam voluntas possunt ex
vero in visum bonum; ex bono in visum melius transire; ideo superesse solarn futuram vitam, in
qua indifferentia huiusmodi cesset. . . . "
65 Ibid., pp. 717, 843ff.